The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi has once again brought an important question to the centre of global diplomacy: Is BRICS emerging as an alternative to the Western-led international order, or is it becoming a platform through which the Global South seeks greater strategic autonomy?
The answer, at least from India’s perspective, is clear. BRICS is not an anti-Western alliance. It is an expanding platform through which emerging economies are seeking a greater voice in global governance, more balanced economic relations and a stronger role in shaping international rules.
The 140-paragraph New Delhi Declaration reflected this carefully calibrated approach. It addressed terrorism, the Middle East crisis, Palestine, economic cooperation, trade, global governance and reforms in international institutions. It also called for disputes to be resolved through dialogue, consultation and diplomacy rather than confrontation.
For India, the diplomatic achievement was not merely securing a declaration. It was preventing BRICS from being defined by geopolitical confrontation.
India’s BRICS Balancing Act
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s message that BRICS is “not against anyone” captures the essential character of India’s approach. New Delhi does not want BRICS to become another military or geopolitical bloc confronting the United States and Europe. At the same time, India does not want the global order to remain dominated by a small number of established powers.
Modi has argued that the Global South should move from being merely a rule-taker to becoming a rule-shaper in international affairs. That position is consistent with India’s long-standing preference for strategic autonomy rather than formal alignment with any single power centre. This is an important distinction.
India can cooperate with the United States on defence, technology and trade while simultaneously working with Russia, China, Iran, Brazil, South Africa and other BRICS members. It can participate in the Quad while remaining a member of BRICS. It can deepen ties with Europe while demanding reforms in institutions dominated historically by Western powers.
This is not diplomatic contradiction. It is the logic of a multipolar world.
BRICS Is Changing — But It Is Not the G7
The expansion of BRICS has dramatically increased its demographic, economic and geopolitical weight. The grouping now represents a substantial share of the world’s population and, on a purchasing-power-parity basis, a very large portion of the global economy.
This naturally raises the question: Has BRICS become more powerful than the G7?
Such a comparison, however, can be misleading.
The G7 is a relatively cohesive grouping of advanced industrial economies with deep economic, technological and institutional links. BRICS is far more diverse. Its members have different political systems, economic structures, strategic priorities and regional interests.
China and Russia may favour a more pronounced challenge to Western dominance. India and several other members are more interested in reforming the existing system without dismantling it. The UAE, for example, has its own extensive economic and strategic relationships with Western powers.
The strength of BRICS therefore lies less in ideological unity and more in its diversity and representational weight.
It brings together countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East that want a greater role in shaping the international system. BRICS need not replace the G7 to become influential. Its very existence demonstrates that global power is becoming more dispersed.
Not Anti-Western — But Not West-Centric Either
This is perhaps the most important distinction emerging from the New Delhi Summit.
BRICS is not necessarily seeking to destroy the Western-led international order. But neither is it willing to accept a world in which the rules are permanently written by a limited group of developed countries.
The distinction between “anti-Western” and “non-Western” is therefore critical.
India’s position is closer to the latter.
New Delhi wants a world in which the United States and Europe remain important partners, but where Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East also have a meaningful role in determining the rules of global trade, finance, technology, security and development.
The Indian position therefore seeks reform rather than rupture.
That approach also explains why New Delhi has been cautious about turning BRICS into an ideological instrument against Washington. Recent analysis of the summit has highlighted India’s effort to keep the grouping focused on practical cooperation rather than geopolitical confrontation.
West Asia and the Question of Strategic Autonomy
The Middle East crisis has given BRICS another test.
The presence of countries with sharply different relationships with the United States and with one another makes consensus difficult. Iran is a BRICS member, while the United Arab Emirates also belongs to the grouping and maintains close relations with Washington. The war and escalating tensions in the region therefore presented New Delhi with a particularly delicate diplomatic challenge.
The New Delhi Declaration called for maximum restraint and reaffirmed the importance of resolving international disputes through dialogue, consultation and diplomacy.
The larger issue is not whether BRICS can create a separate geopolitical order in West Asia. It is whether countries in the region can develop greater economic resilience, strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships without becoming permanently trapped in great-power rivalries.
That is where BRICS can potentially make a difference.
Energy security, food security, trade corridors, investment, technology, digital connectivity and financial cooperation can provide developing economies with greater room for manoeuvre.
Self-reliance does not have to mean isolation.
It can mean having enough economic and strategic alternatives to prevent dependence on any single power.
Terrorism: India’s Important Diplomatic Gain
For India, the declaration’s condemnation of terrorism and reference to the Pahalgam terrorist attack carry particular diplomatic significance.
India has consistently argued that the international community cannot apply different standards to terrorism depending on who commits it or where it occurs. The inclusion of terrorism in the BRICS consensus therefore reinforces New Delhi’s demand for a more consistent international approach.
At the same time, the declaration’s position on Palestine and the humanitarian situation in Gaza demonstrates the complexity of contemporary diplomacy.
Condemning terrorism and protecting civilians are not mutually exclusive positions. A credible international system must oppose terrorism while simultaneously defending civilian life, humanitarian access and international law.
This is precisely where diplomacy must move beyond competing political narratives.
Modi, Putin and Xi: Different Visions Within One Platform
The contrasting perspectives of Modi, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping also reveal the internal diversity of BRICS.
Putin sees BRICS as an important mechanism for reducing the vulnerability of developing countries to Western sanctions and unilateral economic pressure.
Xi Jinping places greater emphasis on multipolarity, reform of global institutions and reducing the dominance of established Western power centres.
India’s position is somewhat different.
New Delhi wants greater representation for developing countries and reform of global institutions, but it does not want BRICS to become an instrument of confrontation with the West.
That difference is not necessarily a weakness.
Indeed, it may be the reason BRICS remains viable.
A grouping of countries with different interests can survive only if it concentrates on areas of common interest rather than attempting to impose a single geopolitical ideology.
The Real Test Lies Beyond Declarations
The New Delhi Summit has strengthened the argument that BRICS is becoming an important pillar of a more multipolar world. But its future influence will depend on whether it can convert political declarations into practical outcomes.
Can BRICS improve trade among its members?
Can it strengthen alternative financial mechanisms without creating new dependencies?
Can it expand cooperation in technology, health, energy and food security?
Can it give developing countries a stronger voice in the IMF, World Bank and United Nations?
Can it contribute meaningfully to peace in regions such as West Asia?
These are more important questions than whether BRICS is “greater than” the G7.
A Multipolar World, Not a New Cold War
The significance of the New Delhi Summit lies precisely here.
BRICS does not need to become an anti-American or anti-European alliance to challenge the concentration of global power. It can influence the international system simply by giving more countries a collective voice.
India’s challenge is to ensure that this process does not turn into another Cold War-style confrontation between competing blocs. Its diplomatic space lies between two extremes: neither Western domination nor anti-Western confrontation.
The emerging objective is a more balanced international system in which developing countries have the economic capacity, political confidence and strategic autonomy to determine their own future.
If BRICS can move in that direction, its importance will not come from replacing the G7.
It will come from helping create a world in which no single bloc has the power to decide the future of everyone else.
That, ultimately, may be the most consequential message emerging from New Delhi.
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